Are Lawyers Rent Seekers
A 1988 study by Laband and John Sophocleus estimated that pension-seeking had reduced total income in the United States by 45%. Dougan and Tullock both confirm the difficulty of finding the cost of finding a rental. Applicants for government-provided benefits will in turn spend up to that benefit amount to receive those benefits if, for example, the limits on class action highlighted by Olson are absent. Similarly, taxpayers advocate loopholes and will in turn spend the value of these loopholes to maintain them (again without collective constraints to act). The sum of the waste from the search for rent is then the total amount of services provided by the government and cases of tax evasion (valuation of benefits and taxes avoided at zero). Dougan says that “total rent-seeking costs are equal to the sum of aggregate current income plus the net public sector deficit.”  An example of rent-seeking in a modern economy is spending money on government subsidies to preserve wealth already created or imposing regulations on competitors to increase their market share.  Another example of rent-seeking is the restriction of access to lucrative professions, such as medieval guilds or modern state certifications and licenses. According to some libertarian perspectives, the taxi license is a classic example of rent-seeking.  To the extent that licensing restricts the overall supply of taxi services (rather than ensuring competence or quality), the prohibition of competition from other rental vehicles leads to the (otherwise consensual) transaction of the taxi service to a forced transfer of part of the customers` remuneration to taxi operators. But the Federalist Society represents only a relatively small minority of lawyers. The bar as a whole tends to the left, and the initiators of law – law professors – are much more to the left as a group.
Despite all the current success of the originalist movement, the transformation of lawyers into a class reminds us how easily the restoration of the constitutional principle can be thwarted. Partisan political victories come and go, but most lawyers will seek to put the law back on a progressive path. This was a mistake in the assumptions surrounding the Constitution that lawyers would remain a permanent anchor for the Republic. It remains to be seen whether this was a fatal mistake. First, it means that lawyers cannot be expected to control themselves because their interests no longer coincide with the stabilization of the regime. For example, the advent of the so-called Missouri plans, which give the bar an outsized vote in selecting state judges, which in turn leads to more sitting judges who will change the law in the interests of lawyers. Professor Gilson writes: “Learning a lot about how lawyers influence economic growth requires careful consideration of the microstructure of legal services. This type of analysis has political implications; No regression in the number of lawyers in relation to the growth of GNP. The concept of rent-seeking would also apply to the corruption of bureaucrats who solicit and extract “bribes” or “rents” for the application of their legal but discretionary power to grant legitimate or illegitimate benefits to clients.  For example, tax officials may accept bribes to reduce the tax burden on taxpayers. Mançur Olson traced the historical consequences of rent-seeking in The Rise and Decline of Nations.
When a country is increasingly dominated by organized interest groups, it loses its economic vitality and falls into decline. Olson argued that countries that have a collapse of the political regime and the interest groups that have rallied around it can radically improve productivity and increase national income because they start with a white vest after collapse. An example of this is Japan after World War II. But over time, new coalitions are forming that, once again, captivate society to redistribute wealth and income to itself. However, social and technological changes have allowed the emergence of new companies and groups.  But as the republic matured, the orientation of lawyers changed. An important reason was the change in the nature of government. The scope of government was very limited at the beginning of the republic.
As a result, most lawyers were employed either in private law (perfecting business arrangements between traders) or in family law (facilitating the transition of assets from one generation to the next). This job necessarily gave them an interest in a stable society. The professional license is just one example of rent research. On the other hand, see this article by Aruna Viswanatha in the Wall Street Journal on the rise of non-compete clauses in areas such as journalism and fast food. Yes, fast food: The Jimmy John`s sandwich chain has made some employees sign contracts prohibiting them from working in another sandwich shop near their home. Evan Starr, an economist at the University of Maryland, found that such a policy prevents workers from changing jobs, altering their bargaining power and thus benefiting companies at the expense of their employees. .